The Iron Grip Tightens Yet Again was posted on an Indian military discussion forum on 15-11-1999. The source of the article is unknown, but its author is MK Narayanan, former chief of the Intelligence Bureau of India, an agency which focuses on internal intelligence gathering and counter-terror, and plays some of the roles taken up by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in the US.

The Iron Grip Tightens Yet Again

By M.K.Narayanan

The storming of the cantonment board office situated within the heavily guarded Badamibagh cantonment in Srinagar on November 3 (in which a major and half-a-dozen Army personnel were killed), followed a week later by simultaneous attacks on three Army camps (one on the outskirts of Srinagar) in which 15 Army personnel were killed, have revived fears of a new and bitter offensive by militant outfits in the on-going "proxy war" in Jammu and Kashmir. These appear to mark a new high in a series of incidents reported from different parts of the state since late July.

These past two years, Jammu and Kashmir has witnessed relative peace, sporadically punctuated by occasional incidents of violence. Since early summer this year, the situation has been showing signs of deterioration, and prior to "Kargil" there already were indications of stepped up activity on the part of the militants. In the post-Kargil phase, however, the situation seems to be approaching near-dangerous proportions. Between August and October, entrenched militant outfits have engaged in tactics such as carrying out attacks on heavily fortified camps of the Rashtriya Rifles and the para-military forces.

The militants have generally employed heavier than usual artillery and state-of-the-art weapons. The assault on the 4 Rashtriya Rifles camp in Kupwara district in early August by heavily-armed militants was typical of this new tactics in vogue. The attack featured assaults from five directions on the camp which was manned by nearly 100 Army personnel. The militants used rockets, light machine guns and AK-47 assault rifles, apart from other assorted weapons. A day later — in the same district — militants ambushed and killed an Army colonel and his bodyguard.

Around Independence day, militants carried out simultaneous attacks at five places in Kupwara district; included among their targets were the 68 Mountain Brigade Hqrs. at Trehgam (which was attacked with 107 mm rockets) and the deputy commissioner’s office. About the same time, militants in Doda district launched an attack on CRPF and State Task Force posts and those in Udhampur district attacked a police post and blew up a police vehicle. Till mid-September, Kupwara, Baramullah, Poonch, Rajouri and Doda districts were the main epicentres of the renewed violence.

After mid-September, a sharp spurt in militancy has been witnessed in Srinagar city, and a situation reminiscent of what prevailed in the mid-Nineties seemed to be emerging here. Rocket attacks on residences and offices, including the state secretariat, bomb attacks and use of hand grenades in the streets have recreated the atmosphere of fear that once existed among the citizenry.

A more aggressive strategy by the various militant outfits is thus apparent. "Suicide" attacks on fortified forts and camps were unknown earlier. Incidents of directly confronting the Army and security forces were relatively few previously. Leading the foreign brigade today are members of the Lashker-e-Tayyaba, the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, the Harkat-ul-Jehad-e-Islami and the Al Badr, apart from the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen. Infiltrations across the Line of Control appear to have gone up substantially of late.

After a long time, there are also reports of sizeable number of Muslim youth exfiltrating to be trained in camps inside Pakistan or on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. The favoured route for infiltration seems to be via Kupwara with the ridges of the Handwara hills providing the mercenaries safe shelter. Figures of infiltration and exfiltration remain a matter of contention between the Army and the civil administration, but there is little doubt about the growing volume of this kind of cross-border traffic.

A similar controversy has erupted about the number of militants and foreign mercenaries currently operating within the state. Civilian agencies put the figure at around 4,000 while the Army contends that the figure is less than 2,000. Documents recovered from captured or killed militants, however, suggest that the bulk of the "mission" at present is intended to probe the weak spots in the country’s CI defences. They are further intended to provide a proper assessment of the ground situation to enable militancy to be stepped up at an opportune time.

The significance of the attack on the 15 Corps Hqrs. within the Badamibagh cantonment — as also on other Army camps coming on top of the attacks on fortified posts and camps of the PMF — has to be properly assessed. The attack on the 15 Corps Hqrs. was reportedly carried out by the Lashker-e-Tayyaba, the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen and the Harkat-ul-Jehad-e-Islami. The militants could hardly have hoped to achieve the necessary degree of surprise unless they could be sure of support from the local population.

The militants must also have calculated that they could not hope to carry out the attack and survive, which reflects a higher level of motivation than seen hitherto. The mercenaries have, evidently, taken a leaf from the LTTE’s book on "suicide attacks" and this should set alarm bells ringing. The Harkat-ul-Mujahideen and the Harkat-ul-Jehad-e-Islami have both benefited considerably from the training provided by Osama bin Laden and his cohorts.

The training camps set up in Afghanistan and maintained by the Taliban and Osama bin Laden have enabled these outfits to continually upgrade their skills. Only recently, the US had acknowledged the role of these two militant groups in carrying out terrorist attacks in Kashmir using Pakistan as a sanctuary. More importantly, India’s strategic experts need to view the Taliban phenomenon and its impact on developments in Jammu and Kashmir with utmost concern.

Being a pre-eminently military rather than a political organisation, the overweening influence of the Taliban on militant outfits like the Lashker-e-Tayyaba, the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen and the Harkat-ul-Jehad-e-Islami is considerable, and this must be factored into our calculations. Any blind belief that the insurgency situation is improving and under control must be avoided. The advent of more such forces — given the stepped up pace of infiltration in the post-Kargil phase — will certainly effect a qualitative change in the situation.

Also, the threats held out by some of the militant outfits viz. that they are prepared and equipped with shoulder fired missiles to counter any upgradation in counter-insurgency techniques, including the use of helicopter gunships, to pound areas like Kupwara, Poonch and Rajouri, must be taken seriously. It would be a mistake to play down or minimise the significance of the present intensification of violence in Jammu and Kashmir. There is obviously a new game plan in the offing, and recent incidents are like pieces on the chequer-board. What they signify must be correctly understood, as also their implications as far as India’s counter-insurgency plans are concerned.

The former ISI chief, Lt. Gen. Javed Nasir, has hinted that with their improved striking capacity the militants could prolong the insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir, and that the war of attrition could finally wear down the will and morale of Indian troops. This months’ three-day conference of the Lashker-e-Tayyaba at Muridke (Pakistan) should be seen not only as a show of strength but also as a defiance of orthodox norms practised by the civilised world. With Osama bin Laden being acclaimed as a "hero of Islam" and references being made to the threat faced by Muslims worldwide from countries like India and the US, there can be little room for complacency.

The underlying theme is to engage in a new form of "jehad" reflecting the imperatives of today’s circumstances. It also presupposes a total overhaul of the earlier strategies adopted after 1989, since these had not produced the desired results. Already, in some respects, the situation in Jammu and Kashmir is beginning to resemble that of the early Nineties. Militant outfits have again been able to impose a form of "civil curfew," and the offensive against symbols of cultural decadence — the insistence on closing down of cinema halls is an example — has been intensified. All Hurriyat leaders, other than Mirwaiz Ummer Farooq, are in custody. Any prospect of a dialogue has thus been rendered infructous. Support for militants among the populace, which had waned considerably specially in Srinagar city, is once again growing.

The willingness of militant outfits to directly confront the security forces and avoid civilian targets is not only rewriting the laws of conflict and covert war but is enhancing their image as "warriors for the faithful." The psychological impetus of this will be considerable and must not be discounted. The active involvement of Pakistan’s regular forces, including its elite Special Regiments, in aid of the mujahideen is now being taken for granted by the militants. In Kargil, these forces were actively taking shelter behind a smokescreen of mujahideen activity.

There is fresh anticipation in militants’ ranks that this dovetailing of efforts would continue and encourages the various militant outfits to persist in their efforts, whatever the cost. The continuing artillery barrage across the Line of Control in several sectors and not only in the Siachen area, as also sporadic attempts to seize territory, helps the militants engaged in the "dirty war" by diverting forces away from CI responsibilities. India must heed former Pakistan information minister Mushahid Hussain’s words, uttered soon after the withdrawal from Kargil viz. that the mujahideen had not withdrawn but had only relocated themselves and could emerge anywhere anytime.

The political dispensation in Pakistan may have changed since but the grim threat behind this message remains. Even more chilling are the implications of what — in a subliminal way — is leading to an unravelling of the situation in Jammu and Kashmir, viz. the spectre of "Jehadi Wahabism" — the omnibus term often used to encompass the more extreme forms of Islamist radicalism. From a philosophical viewpoint, the attempt of the new breed of militants and foreign mercenaries in Jammu and Kashmir is to remove all vestiges of Sufi Islam and establish the dominance of "Sunni (Wahabi) Islam."

This is not peculiar to Jammu and Kashmir and is, possibly, part of a worldwide phenomenon on the part of "purists" to rid Islam of its impure forms. The Markaz-ul-Dawa-ul-Irshad in Pakistan is the main body engaged in the task of effecting such a change. The nexus between the Markaz, mullahs belonging to the JEI (Pakistan), and the military-bureaucratic apparatus provides a solid underpinning to advance this philosophy.

Strategically, Jammu and Kashmir is vital for them as the gateway to the bigger prize viz. India. Tactically, the guiding elements are Pakistan’s ISI and the Taliban, with foreign militant outfits such as the Harkat-ul-Jehad-e-Islami, the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen and the Lashker-e-Tayyaba acting as the main sword arm. Among the militant outfits operating in Jammu and Kashmir currently, mercenaries from as many as 14 nations have been identified. It is possible that representatives from some more nations are also present among them.

Majority of foreign recruits are from Pakistan, Afghanistan, Sudan and some areas of the West Asia. However, Bangladeshis and Myanmarese are also present in sizeable numbers. Behind an ideological camouflage of radical Islam, and backed by vast financial resources from Islamic countries like Saudi Arabia as also Islamic religious networks in the West, the movement in Jammu and Kashmir appears to be metamorphosing into thinly disguised form of "Islamic jehad." The crucial importance of this must not be overlooked by India’s strategic thinkers since it directly draws Jammu and Kashmir into the vortex and wider crescent of Islamist struggles extending from the eastern extremity of Europe to South East Asia.

M.K. Narayanan is a former chief of the Intelligence Bureau