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Pakistan—The Chief Patron-Promoter of Islamic Militancy and
Terrorism is by P.B. Sinha. This paper was published by the Institute for
Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi. The article is accessible
through the IDSA site: www.idsa-india.org
Pakistan—The Chief
Patron-Promoter of Islamic Militancy and Terrorism
- P.B. Sinha
Islamic militancy and extremism has emerged as potentially
the most threatening form of international terrorism since the closing years of
1980s. This form of terrorism has little to do with Islam as such. Islam
provides a convenient religious cover for its perpetrators to achieve political
objectives through the means of violence and coercion. A violent and terrorist
movement, launched in the name of Islam, touches the sentiments of the
followers of Islam, which makes it a more lethal and dangerous destabilising
phenomenon for Muslim as well as non-Muslim countries. From the available
evidence, Pakistan emerges as the chief patron and promoter of Islamic
militancy and terrorism with the aim of utilising it to serve its policy
interests.
From 'Citadel of Islam' to 'Frontline State'
Pakistan's open and official association with Islamist
politics began with the seizure of power by Gen Zia ul Haq in July 1977. In
order to gain legitimacy for his rule and to develop close relations with
Muslim countries, especially oil-rich Saudi Arabia, Zia ul Haq projected
himself as a 'champion' and his country the 'citadel' of Islam. The Soviet
military intervention in neighbouring Afghanistan came as godsent to him to
emerge as the 'true' champion of Islamic cause and defender of the Faith. Saudi
Arabia extended aid to Pakistan through the Jamaat-e-Islami to look after
Afghan refugees, who, in thousands, began 'hijra' across the Durand Line to
flee their Communist-dominated homeland. Pakistan declared that Islam was in
danger in Kabul and gave a call for jihad to throw the infidel Soviet army out
of Afghanistan. The US, Saudi Arabia, China and many Islamic countries poured
in resources in men, material and money to organise resistance to the Soviet
forces. Overnight Afghan refugees were converted into mujahideen (holy
warriors). Pakistan, obviously, assumed the role of the 'frontline state' and
under its supervision and control, a chain of training camps were set up along
the Pak-Afghan border to impart religious indoctrination and military training
to Afghan mujahideen and thousands of enthusiastic Muslim youth from other
countries who had been rushing in to participate in the jihad. Organisations
like the fundamentalist Jamaat-e-Islami, Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Islam and Markaz
al-Dawa al-Irshad were in the forefront of the whole venture. Militant Islam
was raised to a very high pitch and it was strengthened manifold. Witnessed was
the birth of a new breed of militarily-trained religious fanatics ready to take
and give life for an Islamic cause.
In this way, by the mid-1980s a sophisticated, well-equipped
infrastructure to train militant Islamists was available for Pakistan to make
use of. After the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan a highly
motivated, militarily trained and war-hardened force of militant Islamists and
a plethora of sophisticated weapons so generously gifted, principally by the
US, was at Pakistan's disposal. There was no dearth of funds from domestic as
well as foreign sources. Thus, Pakistan had at its disposal all the wherewithal
for the pursuit of promoting and sustaining Muslim militancy and utilising it
to facilitate Islamabad in becoming, if not the leader then, one of the leading
lights of the Islamic world.
Policy Objectives
From the available evidence, three immediate objectives can
be discerned in Pakistan's support and encouragement to Islamic militancy and
terrorism as a means to attain primacy among Muslim countries. First, and the
foremost, targeted India. It was planned that well-trained Islamic
militants-Pakistani, Arab, Afghan and of Kashmiri origin-on their own, as well
as in collaboration with locally drafted elements, would unleash a sustained
campaign of sabotage, subversion, assassinations and other kinds of terrorist
activities in as many parts of India as feasible and thus create chaos and
strife in the country. By putting the government of India under pressure, its
attention in Kashmir would be reduced. In Kashmir trained Islamic extremists
would incite the religious sentiments and susceptibilities of Kashmiri Muslims
and channelise their feelings thus aroused towards anti-Hindu, anti-India
direction. Having thus created a favourable atmosphere, those Islamists and
pro-Pakistan Muslim elements would then resort to a bloody campaign of
terrorism as an 'Islamic war' that would ultimately lead to secession of
Kashmir from India which would facilitate the fulfilment of their
long-cherished dream of incorporating Kashmir into Pakistan. This would also
suitably avenge the humiliation suffered by Pakistan at the hands of India
during the liberation war of Bangladesh and its aftermath.
The second objective related to Afghanistan. The idea was to
instal in Kabul an Islamic government that would remain obliged to be, if not a
puppet in the hands of Islamabad then at least, amenable to protecting and
promoting Pakistan's interests. It could give Pakistan considerable tactical depth
from the military point of view, as well as a comparatively easy and unhampered
access to Central Asia. By exporting Islamic militancy and terror through a
subservient Islamic dispensation in Kabul as well as independent of it,
Pakistan would be able to exercise a commanding ideological and
politico-economic influence over preponderantly Muslim areas of erstwhile
Soviet Union and Xinjiang, the Muslim-majority region in north-west China.
Thirdly, the Islamic militant force would be useful in
promoting the cause of Islam by violent and terrorist means in other parts of
the world. The above approach could also serve another useful purpose
indirectly. After the Soviet withdrawal, a large number of well-trained Muslim
mercenary zealots of Middle Eastern origin stationed in Pakistan could create a
problem for the hosts. They could now indulge in acts which might destabilise
the Pakistan government. What could be done with them? The aforesaid plan
adequately catered to this problem. The Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), the
intelligence organisation of Pakistan's armed forces, began to keep them
gainfully occupied in fresh operations in Kashmir and elsewhere, and thus
minimised the chances of their indulging in activities prejudicial to the host
government.
Implementation of the Plan
After the Iraq-Iran war, Pakistan was co-opted in the
raising of an Islamic militia, with Sunni-Wahhabi orientation and funded by
private Saudi donations. The members of this militia were trained in the tribal
belts of the Frontier province and Baluchistan in Pakistan. Elements of this
militia are reported to have taken part in the civil wars in Tajikistan and
Afghanistan and some of the groups were supposed to be participating even in
far off places like Bosnia, Sudan and Algeria.1
At the initiative of Pakistan, Afghan war veterans of
Afghan, Sudanese and Libyan origin appeared in the ranks of the militant outfit
Hizb-ul-Mujahideen in Kashmir whose number rose to about 300 by late 1992. They
were found to have been involved in violent and terrorist activities in Egypt,
Algeria, America and elsewhere.
As during the Afghan resistance, so also after the Soviet
withdrawal, fundamentalist militant organisations continued to work for the
government plans to promote the 'cause of Islam'. Their activities provided a
convenient cover for denial of official responsibility for ISI moves to promote
Islamic militancy and terror. The Jamaat-e-Islami, for which any militant
action, whether it involved the dispatching of zealots to fight against 'oppression'
of Muslims in any part of the world, or the bombing of an 'enemy installation',
was justified if it was for the larger 'Islamic cause'. A visit to England was
undertaken by the Jamaat chief Qazi Hussain Ahmed with former ISI chief Gen
Hameed Gul in 1994 for the purpose of recruiting volunteers from Muslim
community there.2
A member of the Markaz al-Dawa al-Irshad, while conducting
street-corner recruiting in Karachi in March 1995, reportedly informed3 that 56
of its recruits were killed in 1994 during the fighting against government
troops in Tajikistan, the Philippines, Bosnia and Kashmir. Funding for the
activities of the Markaz, it was claimed, came largely from Saudi
'philanthropists' who were not happy with the way Saudi Arabia was governed by
the royal family.4
Towards the end of 1995, a 3-day convention was organised by
the Jamaat-e-Islami in Lahore where the Jamaat leaders promised to lead an
'Islamic revolution'. It was attended by militants from 30 countries, including
Algeria, Afghanistan, America, Bangladesh, Tunisia, France, Tajikistan, of
course, Pakistan, several other Arab and European countries, Xinjiang (China)
and Kashmir (India).5
The Jamaat-e-Islami runs the Syed Maudoodi International
Institute at its headquarters in Lahore which trains and financially helps
Islamists. At the end of 1995, some 100 Uighur Muslims from Xinjiang (China)
were said to be receiving training in that Institute. The Islamic University in
Islamabad and a host of other madrassas (theological schools) across Pakistan
are actively engaged in producing hard-core Islamists. According to a recent
report6 , at the Binnori Town mosque complex in Karachi's New Town area, the
Jamiat Ul Uloom II Islamiyyah, set up by Maulana Muhammad Yusuf Binnori, is
being run where 8,000 students of different nationalities receive intensive
Islamic education.
There have been three levels of terrorist training camps,
imparting different kinds of military training to Islamists in Pakistan. The
camps around Muzaffarabad in POK trained inmates in hit-and-run tactics. In
another kind of camps under the direct control of the ISI, training was given
to create havoc in India. The third kind of camps were more sensitive, meant to
train terrorists for world-wide operations.7
A leading member of the outfit Harakat-ul-Ansar (HUA)
informed in 1995 that Arabs ran exclusive training camps for the recruits of
the Middle Eastern origin where instructors were Sudanese, Egyptian and Libyan
veterans of the Afghan war. HUA sent its trainee militants to those camps only
for advanced military training that involved operating anti-aircraft guns and
tanks and laying landmines.8
According to a report of 19969, several special training
camps were established in the Chitral region in north-western Pakistan. Earlier
such camps were run in big numbers in the Khost and Jalalabad regions in
Afghanistan. But during the past couple of years, due to a drop in the number
of Kashmiri recruits, several of those camps were closed. Henceforth camps were
organised in Muzaffarabad, Aliabad, Kahuta, Hazira, Mirpur, Rawalkot,
Rawalpindi and some other places in Occupied Kashmir and Pakistan.
After the Pak-raised, funded, equipped and supported
fundamentalist Taliban militia seized power in Kabul in September 1996, two
training camps in Khost were reopened. Camp Al-Badr l is meant for Pakistani
trainees being trained to fight in Kashmir. The Al-Badr II has been meant for
trainees from Arab and other countries, being prepared to fight in Chechnya and
Bosnia.10 In these camps lessons imparted "are on bomb-making, the use of
automatic weapons, rocket launchers and anti-aircraft guns. There are religious
classes, instructing trainees in the nature of jihad."11
In Pakistan's Islamic grandiose designs some other countries
have also been extending cooperation. Libya reportedly transferred some of its
training installation, thereby upgrading the terrorist training infrastructure
in Pakistan-Afghanistan.12 Iran provided assistance to raise a "suicide
brigade" in one of the ISI camps for exceptional operations in India.13
Sudan, besides contributing Sudanese volunteers for the Pakistani game-plan,
accepted a number of Kashmiri militants in its camps for highly specialised
training under personal supervision of Hassan al-Turabi and Mustafa Uthman.14
As regards the number of military training camps for
recruits, by 1992, the ISI was operating 13 permanent, 18 temporary and 8 joint
training camps for Kashmiri youth.15 Newspapers revealed that in an official
secret report submitted to the former Pakistan government of Prime Minister
Benazir Bhutto it was admitted that 38 military training camps existed in
Paksitan from where trained terrorists were being dispatched regularly to
Kashmir, Bosnia, Palestine and some African countries on 'jihad' campaigns. At
the end of 1996, the number of active military training camps has been given as
73 in POK, 23 on Pakistan territory and 12 in Afghanistan.17
By late 1990, an estimated 5,000 Kashmiris were receiving
military training in Pakistan. In 1991 alone, nearly 4,000 Kashmiris were
trained in those facilities. By the summer of 1992, some 3,700 Kashmiri
militants were located in those camps.18
By the beginning of 1993, an estimated 20,000 young
Kashmiris had been trained and armed by and/or in Pakistan to unleash a reign
of 'Islamic' terror in India.19 In early 1995 Pakistani officials reportedly
estimated that since the end of the Afghan war in 1989 at least 10,000 Islamic
militants (obviously other than of Kashmiri origin) were trained by various
groups in Pakistan-Afghanistan border areas.20 A tabloid in France, quoting
counter-intelligence service, informed that 80 young men, mainly from Paris
suburbs, underwent military training on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border between
1991 and 1994.21
In the early 1980s, one Sheikh Mubarak Ali Shah Gilani, in
collaboration with the ISI, had started an organisation, Jamaat-ul-Fuqra. In
1992, he started a camp in Sudan imparting instruction in terrorist activities.
A cadre of about 3,000 such trainees was created. Gilani now resides in
Pakistan, but most Fuqra cells are now located in North America. It is
suspected that the ISI had been clandestinely using those trained terrorists
against Indian targets.22
The Harakat-ul-Ansar (HUA), which was created in October
1993 by merging two organisations23 which were formed only in 1992, had
militant and terrorist operations targeting Kashmir as its main aim, but it
also contributed to other ventures. Its headquarters is in Muzaffarabad in POK.
The HUA, enjoying "full backing" of Pakistan has been involved in
extremist activities in Tajikistan, Bosnia, Myanmar, apart from Kashmir.24 In
1995, HUA claimed25 credit for having trained, since 1987 (obviously under some
other name), more than 4,000 militants including Pakistanis, Indians, Arabs and
a small number of Americans in making bombs, throwing grenades and firing
assault weapons. According to an official Afghan source26, there were about
8,000 members of HUA in 1994 who were 'supporting' the Kashmiri 'struggle'.
At the end of 1995 it was reported that the ISI, in
collaboration with the Jamat-e-Islami, was raising a Taliban-type force
comprising young students from Pakistan with the sole purpose of fighting
Indian security forces in Jammu and Kashmir. A total of 265 Pakistani youth were
given training. Specialised training was imparted through two specialised Task
Force courses for 40 youths each.27
Pakistan has reportedly been utilising the huge amount of
money earned by drug traffickers and their services in furtherance of its 'Islamic
mission' in India. ISI levies a particular share from the income from drug
trafficking which is spent on perpetrating terrorists activities in India.28 It
has also trained two groups of traffickers of about 500 to perpetrate terrorist
activities in India. Those groups are allowed unrestricted drug trafficking
carrying with them explosives and arms.29
Needless to say that most of the terrorist incidents like
assassinations, bomb explosions, firing incidents, sabotage and subversion that
have been prepetrated in Jammu and Kashmir and other parts of the country since
the end of 1980s and the beginning of 1990s are the outcome of Pakistan's
'Islamic mission' in India.
During the Afghan war, Pakistan had specially favoured the
Hizb-e-Islami group led by Pushtun Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, hoping that once in
power in Kabul, Hekmatyar would protect and promote Islamabad's strategic
interests. Hekmatyar, too, on his part, helped Pakistan in its plans directed
against Kashmir. Hekmatyar continued patronising Hizb-ul-Mujahideen and played
a vital role in sending arms and Afghan guerrillas to support it.30 But after
the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, and even after the fall of
Dr. Najeebullah's government in 1992, Hekmatyar could not attain power in Kabul.
A plan was then devised by Pakistan to raise a militia of talibans31 as an
alternative to Hekmatyar's Hizb-e-Islami.
Initially most of the Afghan youth constituting the Taliban
militia were products of politico-religious leader Fazl-ur-Rahman's Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam
(JUI)-run madrassas in Baluchistan and the Frontier Province. The major chunk
of today's Taliban leadership as well as soldiers has come from two schools,
viz., the Dar-ul-Uloom set up by Maulana Abdul Haq at Akora Khattak and the
Binnori Chain of madrassas, the centre of which is situated in Binnori Town in
Karachi.32 At least three members of Mullah Omar's six-member Council and some
of the top military commanders of the Taliban have emerged from the Binnori
Town madrassa or one of its affiliated schools situated all over the country.33
Sunni fundamentalists to the core and highly motivated, many
of the Taliban had participated in the Afghan war, who, after the withdrawal of
the Soviet forces, had returned to their schools. It is from among those that
Pakistan's Interior Minister Nasrullah Babar recruited them and in
collaboration with the ISI raised the Taliban militia in the Spin Baldak area
of Kandahar inside Afghanistan.
Six months before the emergence of the Taliban, camps were
set up by Pakistan's Frontier Corps to train talibs before they were sent to
fight against Afghan local warlords. In 1994, the Taliban were able to capture
Kandahar and Herat regions, culminating in September 1996, in occupying Kabul
after making Burhanuddin Rabbani's government and his supporters flee to the
north, and thus bringing nearly two-thirds of Afghanistan under their control.
Thus was catapulted to power in Kabul the Taliban militia of hardline Sunni
fundamentalist and highly motivated 'Afghan' young fighters, trained, armed and
funded, equipped and guided by Pakistan. In its bid to capture the remaining
part of Afghanistan from opposition groups the Taliban are continuing to
receive large quantities of arms and equipment and directions under the direct
supervision of the ISI chief Brig Ashraf Afridi. Pakistani Pushtoo-speaking
commanders and soldiers, in the guise of Taliban, have been leading the Taliban
in thier military campaigns.34 Recent press reports indicate that a drive has
been launched in Pakistan to recruit more young fighters, Afghan and Pakistani,
to bolster the strength of the beleaguered Taliban.
Under the patronage of the ISI, informs a Pakistan
monthly35, Pakistani religious organisations had established close contacts
with clandestine Islamic movements in Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.
Several of Pakistani Islamic fighters crossed over to these predominantly
Muslim Republics, which were still part of the erstwhile U.S.S.R., to promote
the 'cause' of Islam against infidel Communists. The Soviet officials had
protested strongly to Pakistan agaisnt the infiltration of Pakistani Islamists
into those states.36 Probably due to Tajikistan's geographical proximity to,
and contiguity with China's Xinjiang region, Pakistan's 'Islamic mission' in
Tajikistan has been more extensive and prolonged one. A separate base was
created to train Tajik militants in Pakistan.37
Another area in the region, which has been recipient of
Pakistan's Islamic 'benevolence', is Chechnya, a small Muslim-majority part of
southern Russia. Engaged in a war of total secession from Moscow, Chechens have
been extended various kinds of help and assistance from Pakistan. Russian
intelligence reports have disclosed that Pakistani instructors imparted
subversive training to Chechen rebels.38 Russian officers alleged that hundreds
of Afghans from refugee camps in Pakistan were recruited to fight the Russian
forces in Chechnya. Leaders of Pakistan's Jamaat-e-Islami confirmed that
"their volunteers have been fighting alongside Dudayev's forces."39
The Russian Prime Minister, Victor Chernomyrdin, was quoted as having said
publicly in New Delhi that Pakistani mercenaries had also been fighting in
Chechnya.40
Apart from providing ideological and military training to
Islamic militants from Xinjiang, Pakistan is reported to have been arranging
for extension of various kind of assistance to Uighur Muslims of the
north-western Chinese province.41 A considerable number of Muslim dissidents
from China are stationed in Pakistan. On the eve of Pakistan President Farooq
Leghari's visit to China, Pakistan deported 12 of those dissidents in May 1997.
Beijing has demanded from Islamabad deportation of another 130 Muslim
dissidents.42
Apart from hosting a wide variety of Afghan war veterans of
different nationalities, Pakistan became home and a base and transit point for
outside operation for many Islamic militants and a safe haven for many
terrorist-fugitives. Officials in Cairo said that Pakistan has been home for 8
main leaders of Egypt's Islamic militant groups, who used the country as a base
during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Even after the end of the conflict
in Kabul against Moscow, Egyptian Islamists have used Pakistan as a crossing
point to other nations while fleeing death sentences in their own country.
Three condemned Egyptian Islamists, belonging to Al-Jihad and Al-Gamaa
al-Islamiyya were reported to be living in Pakistan in 1995.43 Towards the end
of 1995 it was reported that 600 Egyptians, about 800 Sudanese and 600 Algerians
were stationed illegally in Pakistan.44 At that very time Pakistan Ambassador
in Egypt told the Cairo daily Al-Akhbar that some 2,800 Islamic militants were
based in Afghanistan45 (read Pakistan). In the middle of 1996, International
Herald Tribune,46, on the basis of "the best intelligence figures,"
put their number at 5,000 trained Saudis, 3,000 Yemenis, 2,800 Algerians, 2,000
Egyptians and perhaps 2,000 Palestinians, Jordanians, Lebanese, Iranians and
others. Whether it was Algeria or Egypt, Palestine or Tajikistan, these
Islamists were prepared to go anywhere if it was a question of fighting in the
name of Allah.47
In a letter to the UN Security Council, the Ethiopian
government stated that most of the terrorists who took part in an unsuccessful
murderous attempt on the Egyptian President, Hosni Mubarak in Addis Ababa in
June 1995 resided in Pakistan and were recruited there.48
According to another report, suspects in a wave of terrorist
bombings in France in the latter half of 1995 had travelled to Pakistan and
Afghanistan, where they might have received training in handling weapons and
explosives.49 Condemning Pakistan on that account, Egyptian Interior Minister
Hassan al-Alfi had told Arab newspaper Al-Hayat that "to allow these
criminals to carry out terrorist attacks and to allow them freedom of action
constitutes a weak point for any state."50
On top of all came the truck-bombing of Egyptian Embassy in
Islamabad on November 19, 1995, in which 19 people were killed and over 50
injured. The responsibility for the dastardly act was claimed by members of
Al-Jihad and Al-Gamaa al-Islamiyya,51 two Islamic militant outfits engaged in a
terrorist campaign agaisnt President Hosni Mubarak's 'un-Islamic' government in
Egypt.
The day after the Egyptian Embassy bombing, it was
officially admitted that the International Islamic University in Islamabad was
a hub of terrorist activities. A number of certified terrorists had been taking
refuge at the University campus, told the Interior Minister Nasrullah Babar. The
institute was being allowed to nurture militants.52
Under pressure from Egypt, Algeria, Jordan and the Western
world, particularly the US, some steps were announced in 1994 and 1995 by
Pakistan to restrict militant activities, directed not against India or
Afghanistan but, against other countries. Pakistan asked Afghan aid groups,
many acting as fronts for militant organisations, to leave the country. That
made those groups go underground and pushed some of them into Afghanistan. It
was also announced to curb the activities of madrassas. All this was primarily
aimed at avoiding being branded by the US State Department as a country that
sponsors terrorism, which automatically disqualifies it for US economic aid.
The real purpose of Islamabad was promptly achieved. Patterns of Global
Terrorism 1995, annual report issued by US Department of State, acknowledged
that "Pakistan took steps in 1995 to curb the activities of Afghan
mujaheedin and sympathetic Arabs and Pakistanis in the Pakistani regions that border
Afghanistan."53
The restrictions imposed on militant activities and
movements were "little more than eyewash."54 The effectiveness, or,
to be correct, lack of those restrictions can be judged from the fact that the
truck-bombing of the Egyptian Embassy in Islamabad took place after the
announcement of the restrictions with much publicity. Even after the Pakistan
government had declared its policy of externing all Arab militants based in
Peshawar, many Arab Islamic fighters continued to live there untroubled.55 One
Egyptian Islamist, condemned by an Egyptian court, admitted56 that since
receiving externment notice he had taken many trips to and from Pakistan. He
said he had been to Bosnia, some of the Central Asian states, Algeria and even
Kashmir. This could not have happened without some official support.
The rationale behind such policy was, in the words of the
chief of the Services Offices for Afghanistan, that "for a true Muslim,
jihad will not be over for as long as there is a single non-Muslim left in the
world."57
In 1993 the US House Republican Committee's Task Force on
Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare had come to the conclusion that "the
ISI's vast and highly experienced terrorist support infrastructure, tempered by
years of assistance to such regional armed struggles as those in Afghanistan
and India, is increasingly expanding its operations to include the sponsoring
of global Islamist terrorism."58 A glance at the above discussions would
lead one to the only conclusion that the Task Force Report's opinion of 1993
holds true even now.
Tacit American Support
The United States has been prompt to blacklist the countries
which, in its opinion, sponsored international terrorism, directly or
indirectly. The US added Sudan to the list of 'pariah' states which already
included Cuba, North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Libya and Syria. But, inspite of
overwhelming amount of supportive evidence, Pakistan has been spared by America
from being declared a terrorism sponsoring country.
In its assessment for the year 1993, the US State Department
observed that "the Government of Pakistan acknowledges that it continued
to give moral, political and diplomatic support to Kashmiri militants but
denies allegation of other assistance. However, there were credible reports in
1993 of official Pakistani support to Kashmiri militants who undertook attacks
of terrorism"in Kashmir. "Some support came from private
organisations such as Jamaat-i-Islami. There were also reports of support to
Sikh militants engaged in terrorism in northern India," added the
report.59 Two years later, the State Department report made some additions to
their assessment and reiterated: "There continued to be credible reports
in 1995, however, of official Pakistani support to militants fighting in Kashmir,
including Pakistani, Afghan, and Arab nationals some of whom engage in
terrorism. One Pakistan-backed group, Harakat-ul-Ansar (HUA), is believed to be
linked to Al-Faran, the group that claimed responsibility for the kidnapping in
July (1995) in Kashmir of (6 western tourists). Other Pakistan-backed groups
claimed responsibility for numerous bombings in Kashmir, including one against
foreign journalists."60 But, instead of taking any logical punitive action
against Islamabad in the light of this clear indictment of Pakistan by its own
State Department, the Clinton administration removed the name of Pakistan from
the "watch list" of countries suspected to be involved in encouraging
terrorism where it was placed by the earlier Bush administration. The reason
advanced for this benign action in favour of Pakistan was that "Pakistan
was extraordinarily helpful to the US last year in a major anti-terrorist
effort—the arrest and extradition of the leader of the World Trade Centre
bombing." (Emphasis added)61.
Not unexpectedly, the next year's 'assessment' of the State
Department removed the word "credible", used for the past several
years, characterising the Pakistani official support to international terrorism
and simply stated that "reports continued in 1996, however, of official
Pakistani support to militants fighting in Kashmir."62
From the attitude of the US the message was clear to the
Pakistan government that if only Islamabad cooperated with Washington in its
efforts to combat terrorism directed against America itself, the US would not
only not take any serious notice of, but even condone other
terrorism-sponsoring activities of Pakistan. This has been a big indirect
support to Pakistan in nursing, promoting and sponsoring Islamic terrorism
against India and other regions.
Assessment
Pakistan's efforts in promoting and sponsoring Islamic
militancy and terrorism in India, in general, and the state of Jammu and
Kashmir, in particular, have, no doubt, created a lot of trouble for the
government and people of India. But has all that brought the Pakistan rulers
anywhere nearer their cherished goal? In this respect Pakistani planners ought
to have realised that, come what may, no government in New Delhi can allow
anyone to impinge upon the territorial integrity of the country. Similarly, a
strong country like China cannot permit the newly emerging Islamic fervour
among Uighur Muslims to develop into Xinjiang's secession. Of course, in
Afghanistan, Pakistan has succeeded in facilitating the Pak-organised,
supported, equipped and guided Sunni fundamentalist force, the Taliban, to
capture power in Kabul and control nearly two-thirds of the country. But the
cost of the keeping the Taliban in power in Kabul would be very heavy for
Pakistan in terms of men, money and material. Still in the long run, it is
highly unlikely that any Afghan dispensation in Kabul, be it even the Taliban,
in view of fiercely independent nature of the Afghans, would be willing to play
a second fiddle to protect and promote Pakistan's strategic interests and
designs. The case of Central Asian Muslim-majority republics, Egypt, Algeria
and other countries has shown that they are prepared to face, by every means,
the threat of Pak-inspired and encouraged Islamic militancy and terror. It is
quite clear that Pakistan, by its policy of promoting and sponsoring Islamic
militancy and terror can only create difficulties and problems for the target
countries, nothing more.
On the other hand, Pakistan's plans have ben casting their
evil shadow on the promoter-patron itself. Soon after the Soviets left
Afghanistan, the Afghan mujahideen turned Pakistan into a battlefield to settle
accounts with their own compatriots, as well as with others stationed south of
the Durand Line. Pilferation and proliferation of small but lethal weapons are
the direct fallout of Pakistan's efforts in continuing 'jihad'. It has given
tremendous boost to gun-culture in Pakistan which, in turn, has encouraged
sectarian violence and domesitc terrorism.
The products of Pak-Afghan militant training camps have made
Pakistan an arena for their activities directed against their own as well as
other countires. The Afghan war veterans and Afghan mujahideen have not spared
even their host and benefactor from their militant fury. According to a report
of July 1996,63 an Arabic language pamphlet was circulating in Peshawar,
authored by a Jordanian living in Afghanistan, who was said to have been
recruiting youngmen from Pakistan and Afghanistan to join his group called
Khalifa to raise an Islamic army to wage war against the West and its Muslim
allies. Pakistan could well be regarded as one of the West's 'Muslim allies'.
In other respects also Pakistan is now troubled by the
activities of militants trained in Pakistani madrassas in the name of 'jihad'.
Militants chased away by Indian security forces have now started indulging in
undesirable activities. It is said that those militants have been instrumental
in spreading violence in POK and committing crimes against women like
molestation and rape.
The outcome and fallout of Pakistan policy of nursing,
promoting and sponsoring Islamic militancy and terror since the end of the
1980s is there for everyone to see. It is now for the Pakistan authorities to
seriously think whether the results achieved by their policy of patronising,
promoting and sponsoring Muslim militancy and terrorism are commensurate to the
enormous efforts and resources, their own as well as those secured from other
sources, put in for the pursuit of that policy.
Notes
1. Sreedhar and Kapil Kaul, "Politics of Islamic
Terrorism in West Asia : Internal and External dimensions," Strategic
Analysis (New Delhi), June 1996, Vol.XIX, No.3, p.448.
2. UNI report in The Pioneer (New Delhi) August 22, 1994.
3. J.W. Anderson and Kamran Khan (of Washington Post
Service), "Pakistan Tiptoes Around Armed Islamic Militants,"
International Herald Tribune (Hongkong), March 10, 1995, reproduced in Sreedhar
etc, n. 1, Appendix 1, p.462.
4. Ibid. p.463.
5. See Ahmed Rashid, "The Chinese Connection," The
Herald (Karachi), December 1995.
6. Kamal Siddiqi, "Call of the Taliban," The
Indian Express (New Delhi), June 2, 1997.
7. Interview of Yossef Bodansky, Staff Director to US House
of Representatives Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare, in a
30-minute documentary entitled "Terror Incorporated", telecast by the
Public Broadcasting System (PBS), as reported in The Tribune (Chandigarh),
March 3, 1995.
8. Note 3.
9. Punjab Kesari (Delhi), August 2, 1996.
10. An eyewitness account of Caroline Rees, correspondent,
in The Independent (London), cited in The Tribune, November 22, 1996.
11. Ibid.
12. 'Pakistan, Afghanistan and the Export of Terrorism' in
The New Islamist International (a report by Task Force on Terrorism and
Unconventional Warfare By House Republican Research Committee, US House of
Representatives, Washington D.C., February 1, 1993) (hereafter referred to as
'Task Force Report '93'), p.44.
13. Ibid. p.46.
14. Ibid. p.44.
15. Ibid. p.46.
16. London-datelined 'Bhasha' report in Punjab Kesari, May
12, 1997.
17. A Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India,
document, cited in the Times of India (New Delhi), January 5, 1997.
18. 'Task Force Report 93, n. 12, pp.45 and 46.
19. Ibid., p.45.
20. Anderson, n. 3.
21. AFP report in Khaleej Times (Dubai), November 2, 1995.
22. Newsweek, cited in Punjab Kesari, February 28, 1994.
23. They were the Harakat-ul-Jihad-e-Islami and the Harakat
al-Mujahideen.
24. Al-Faran, a front group of the HUA, took six foreign
tourists as hostage in Kashmir in July 1995. One of the hostages managed to
escape and another was beheaded by the terrorists. The fate of the remaining
four hostages is not known with certainty.
25. Anderson, n. 3, p.460.
26. Afghanistan's Deputy Prime Minister Maulana Rahmani,
quoted in the Report of US House (of Representatives) Republican Committee Task
Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare, cited in The Indian Express,
June 29, 1994.
27. Ibid., Dcember 21, 1995.
28. O.P. Sharma, Director General of Police, Punjab, as
reported in Punjab Kesari, March 3, 1996.
29. Ibid. March 16, 1996.
30. The Tribune, September 29, 1996.
31. Taliban is Pushtoo plural of the word 'talib', meaning
'student'.
32. Kamal Siddiqi, "Call of the Taliban," The
Indian Express, June 2, 1997.
33. Ibid.
34. A report in The Sunday Telegraph (London), June 1, 1997,
cited in a London-datelined 'Bhasha' dispatch in Punjab Kesari, June 2, 1997.
35. Zahid Hussain, "Islamic Warriors," Newsline
(Karachi), Febraury 1995, p.26.
36. Ibid.
37. A December 1995 report in the Russian Daily Izvestia,
cited in a PTI report in The Indian Express, May 22, 1996.
38. Ibid.
39. Zahid Hussain, n. 35, p.26.
40. The Indian Express, January 5, 1995.
41. For Pakistan's involvement in promoting Islamic
militancy in Xinjiang, see P.B. Sinha, "Islamic Militancy and Separatism
in Xinjiang," Strategic Analysis, June 1997, Vol XX, No.3, pp.452-453 and
456.
42. 'Intelligence', Far Eastern Economic Review (Hongkong),
July 10, 1997, p.12.
43. Cairo-datelines AFP report in The Asian Age (New Delhi),
November 21, 1995.
44. The Nation (Islamabad), November 23, 1995.
45. AFP report in Ibid., November 25, 1995.
46. John K. Cooley in International Herald Tribune, July 30,
1996.
47. Zafar Abbas, "Back to the Frontline," The
Herald, December 1995, p.29.
48. The Times of India, June 20, 1996.
49. AFP report in Khaleej Times, November 2, 1995.
50. AFP report in The Nation, November 25, 1995.
51. Zafar Abbas, n. 47, p.26.
52. 'School for Scandal?', Ibid., p.32.
53. Patterns of Global Terrorism (United States Department
of State)(hereafter referred to as 'Patterns'), 1995, p.5.
54. A.A. Khan, "Have Gun Will Travel," The Herald,
p.31.
55. Ibid.
56. Ibid., p.32.
57. Ibid.
58. 'Task Force Report 93, n. 12, p.52.
59. 'Patterns' 1993, p.9.
60. 'Patterns' 1995, p.6.
61. US Coordinator for counter-terrorism, Philip C. wilcox,
quoted in 'Innocent till proven guilty', The Week (Kochi), June 2, 1996, p.6.
62. 'Patterns' 1996, cited in The Indian Express, May 2,
1997.
63. AP report in The Asian Age, July 24, 1996.