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Pakistan’s Kashmir Strategy is a research paper by Yossef
Bodansky. At the time of writing the paper, he was the Director of the Task
Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare of the U.S. Congress, as well as
the World Terrorism Analyst with the Freeman Center for Strategic Studies
(Houston TX). Mr. Bodansky is a contributing editor of Defense and Foreign
Affairs; Strategic Policy, the author of three books (Target America,
Terror, and Crisis in Korea), several book chapters, and numerous
articles in several periodicals including Global Affairs, JANE's Defence
Weekly,Defense and Foreign Affairs; Strategic Policy, Business Week. In
the 1980s, he acted as a senior consultant for the Department of Defense and
the Department of State. The papers can be found on line through: http://freeman.io.com
Published by
Phone or
Fax: 713-723-6016 * E-mail: BSAPHIR@AOL.COM
Freeman Center Web Site (URL): http://freeman.io.com
Kashmir is unique among all the
crisis points along the Indo-Pakistani border in that a marked escalation of
the fighting -- both insurgency and regular -- is virtually inevitable before
any effort for a peaceful solution can succeed. The primary reasons is the
extent of the ideological commitment and self-interests of several of the key
players involved. *
For Islamabad, the liberation of
Kashmir is a sacred mission, the only task unfulfilled since Muhammad Ali
Jinnah's days. Moreover, a crisis in Kashmir constitutes an excellent outlet
for the frustration at home, an instrument for the mobilization of the masses,
as well as gaining the support of the Islamist parties and primarily their
loyalists in the military and the ISI.
The ISI has a major interest to
continue the crisis. Back in the 1970s, Pakistan started to train Sikhs and
other Indian separatist movements as part of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's strategy for
forward strategic depth. Pakistan adopted the sponsorship of terrorism and
subversion as an instrument to substitute for the lack of strategic depth and
early warning capabilities. The Pakistani sponsored terrorists and the
Pakistani intelligence operatives in their ranks would be able to warn Pakistan
of any impending Indian invasion, and then launch a guerrilla warfare against
the Indian Army even before it reached the border with Pakistan. Therefore,
sponsoring separatist subversion has become a crucial component of Islamabad's
national military strategy.
During the 1980s, the ISI
completed a vast training and support infrastructure for the Afghan resistance
that was also used for the training and support of other regional groups. There
was a corresponding ideological development in Indian Kashmir. Since 1984,
virtually suddenly, the prevailing popular sentiments in Indian Kashmir was
that "Islam is in Danger," and that sentiment, rather than
nationalism, began mobilizing the youth.
The timing of the change was not
spontaneous. Hashim Qureshi, the founder of the nationalist JKLF [Jammu Kashmir
Liberation Front] recently recalled how "in 1984 ISI Generals and
Brigadiers approached me with the offer: 'get us young people for training from
the Valley so that they could fight India on return.'" When he refused,
Qureshi explained, his struggle was taken over by the ISI who installed
Amanullah Khan. "It is tragic that so-called nationalist Amanullah Khan
and some of his supporters started the present struggle in Kashmir in league
with the ISI. A man with common intelligence can understand that any movement
started in a Muslim majority area with the help of Pakistani military
intelligence will eventually mean religious struggle." Qureshi stressed
that by 1993 "Amanullah proved that he was an agent of the ISI"
having sacrificed the nationalist liberation struggle in Kashmir on the altar
of Islamist politics. Qureshi himself had to flee Pakistan and seek political
asylum in Western Europe.
Meanwhile, by the late-1980s,
with the war in Afghanistan slowing down, the vast network of training camps
for Afghan Mujahideen was transformed by the ISI into a center of
Islamist terrorism throughout south Asia, as well as the melting pot of the
world wide Islamist Jihad. This transformation concurred with an
active ISI program "to initiate full-fledged subversion in Kashmir
Valley" that is still escalating. At first, the ISI's assistance to the
Kashmiri Islamists was funnelled through Gulbaddin Hekmatiyar's Hizb-i
Islami, thus providing Islamabad with deniability.
Islamabad increases its support
for Islamist terrorism in Kashmir because there is a genuine whole hearted
commitment to Jihad among the Kashmiri terrorists and their
international volunteers. Moreover, the ISI transformed its major paramilitary
command into a major political force as a direct result of their increase of
support for terrorism in India. Presently, there is a need for a mission use
for the ISI's numerous para-military and Afghan forces, as well as an
institutional interest in preserving the political clout that comes with these
operations. Islamabad finds a task for the ISI's vast Pakistani and Afghan
cadres previously involved in sponsoring the Jihad in Afghanistan but
who are now no longer needed, that would keep them away from domestic politics
and power struggles. Indeed, the escalation of terrorism and subversion since
the early 1990s is considered a part of the ISI's implementation of a long-term
program.
Iran considers an escalation in
the Jihad for the liberation of Kashmir a key for the assertion of
strategic prominence of the Tehran-led Islamic Bloc, as well as a demonstration
of its regional power position. In order to expedite the implementation, the
Iranians are utilizing a sacred mission, that is, liberating the area of
Ayatollah Khomeyni's roots, as a rallying point. The extent of agitation and
indoctrination of Iranian, Afghan, Kashmiri, Indian/Pakistani and other
volunteers in the special forces and terrorist training camps in Iran makes it
impossible to call off such a Jihad for any reason.
Similarly, the Armed Islamic
Movement, as well as several Saudis, Gulf Arabs, and other supporters of
Islamist causes, put Kashmir high on their list of jihads to be
fought. Indeed, Kashmir is mentioned in lists of sacred goals recovered in
Israel (HAMAS), Algeria (FIS), Sudan, Egypt, to name but a few examples.
Kashmir is a high priority objective because of the firm belief in the
possibility of success. It is an easy campaign to wage for logistical
considerations because of the presence of numerous cadres and large weapon
stockpiles in Afghanistan and Pakistan. AIM's operations are closely
coordinated in Tehran and Khartoum.
All of these states and
organizations have large, highly trained and well equipped forces. Virtually
all of these forces have not yet been committed to the Kashmiri jihad.
The sole attempt for mass mobilization, in 1992, was stopped by the Pakistani
authorities for fear of Indian retaliation. However, Islamabad desperately
needs an external challenge for its own domestic political reasons, ranging
from diversion of popular attention away from the domestic collapse to finding
"something to do" for the ISI and the military other than meddling in
politics. Islamabad would receive massive financial assistance from Iran,
Saudis and Gulf Arabs, as was the case during the Afghan war, if there is a jihad
to be waged. Kashmir is the only viable option. Moreover, even if Islamabad is
reluctant to move, many of the irregulars -- Pakistanis, Afghans, Kashmiris and
Arab 'Afghans' -- will eventually start the escalations on their own with a nod
and a wink from the ISI and the military, thus dragging the supporting powers
-- themselves already bound by their declaratory commitments -- into the
rapidly escalating crisis.
Presently, Pakistani officials
repeatedly vow to "liberate" Kashmir, or enforce the recognition of
"Muslims' rights" in the Valley, even at a risk of a major crisis.
This rising militancy of Pakistani officials is far from being empty rhetoric.
Islamabad uses the escalation in Kashmir as a cover for the overall expansion
of the terrorist training and support system for operations in Central Asia and
elsewhere in the world.
In order to escalate their
Islamist Jihad, the ISI established in the early 1990s the Markaz-Dawar,
a center for world wide Islamist activities. Mulavi Zaki, the center's
spiritual leader, told the trainees that their destiny was to fight and
liberate "the land of Allah from infidels" wherever they
might be. The commanders and instructors are AIM members, primarily Ikhwan
from Algeria, Sudan and Egypt. Most of them had fought for more than a decade
in Afghanistan.
In early 1992, with world
attention paid to their presence in Peshawar area, some of these 'Afghans' were
transferred to Azzad Kashmir where new camps were being built for them by the
Pakistani Army. By early 1993, there were over 1,000 'Afghan' Mujahideen
in the Markaz-Dawar alone. Following the completion of advance
training, they are being sent to Kashmir, Algeria and Egypt.
Since mid 1993, despite
Islamabad's claims to the contrary, the main offices of the Islamist terrorist organizations
remained functioning in Peshawar. The series of "raids" by police
since October 1992 had resulted in the transfer of some of the 200 hard core
terrorists specifically wanted by the West to facilities near Jalalabad, just
across the Afghan border. In principle, the reports of mass deportation of
'Afghans' from Peshawar by the Pakistani government were baseless. In the fall
of 1993, an Arab 'Afghan' with first hand knowledge confirmed that
"Pakistan pushed them out of the door only to open a window for them to
return and they come and go as they wish in Peshawar."
In the summer of 1993, the ISI
had in the Markaz-Dawar another force of some 200 Afghans -- mainly
Jallalluddin Haqqani's people from the Khowst area -- that operated under
direct ISI command and were earmarked for special operations in Kashmir.
According to Muhammad Fazal al-Hajj, a PFLP [Popular Front for the Liberation
of Palestine] terrorist captured in southern Kashmir in the summer of 1993,
additional 'Afghans' and Afghans were being prepared by the ISI for the
forthcoming escalation. At least 400 'Afghans' and Afghans were known to being
organized in one camp, where they were trained by the ISI to augment and
provide quality core of leadership for the Kashmiri Hizb-ul-Mujahideen.
There was a corresponding expansion of advance preparations of Islamist
terrorists for operations in forward bases in Kashmir. Some 600 terrorists,
about half of them veteran 'Afghans' and Afghans, were already at the final
phase of their training.
Ultimately, many Arab volunteers
continue to arrive in Peshawar almost every day. The main Ikhwan
facility is the Maktaba-i-Khidmat originally established by the late
Shaykh Abd Allah Azzam and now run by his successor Shaykh Muhammad Yussaf
Abbas. It still processes the volunteers for AIM. At present, however, many of
the volunteers are then dispatched to the numerous training camps run by Arab
'Afghan' militants inside Afghanistan. The ISI continues to provide the weapons
and expertise. In July 1994, Sardar Abdul Qayum Khan, the prime minister of
Pakistani Azzad Kashmir, acknowledged that "there are a number of elements
from various nationalities who participate in the Jihad." He
identified most of them as "Arab 'Afghans'."
Meanwhile, the Government of
Afghanistan also increased its support for terrorist training and preparations.
This growing direct involvement is important because the main operating bases
for the ISI's operations in Central Asia are in northern Afghanistan. In the
aftermath of the fall of Kabul, many Arab 'Afghans' returned to Peshawar where
they were organized by the Pakistani government to support various Islamist
causes in concert with Iran and Sudan. Many of them returned to Afghanistan as
quality forces and personal guard details. For example, Ahmad Shah Massud
maintains some 70-80 Arab 'Afghans' in southern Kabul for special tasks, from
"help" in political purges to fighting Gulbaddin Hekmatiyar.
In early December 1993, during a
state visit to Pakistan, the Deputy Prime Minister of Afghanistan, Maulana
Arsalan Rahmani, elaborated on Kabul's perception of the Islamist struggles
world wide, and especially in south and central Asia. He hailed Afghanistan's
active support for Islamist armed causes world wide and stressed that "we
don't consider this support as intervention in any country's internal
affairs." Maulana Arsalan Rahmani admitted that Afghanistan was providing
military assistance to various insurgencies because "we cannot remain
aloof from what is happening to the Muslims in occupied Kashmir, Tajikistan,
Bosnia, Somalia, Burma, Palestine and elsewhere. ... We are not terrorists but Mujahideen
fighting for restoring peace and preserving honor."
He acknowledged that Afghanistan
also played a major role in a recent major development among the Islamist
organizations fighting in Indian Kashmir, namely, the merger of the Harakat
ul-Jihad Islami and Harakat ul-Mujahideen into the potent Harakat
ul-Ansar. This support for the unity was but part of the active support
given by Afghanistan to the Islamist fighters in Kashmir, Tajikistan, and
Bosnia. "There are about 8,000 members of Harakat ul-Ansar who
are supporting the Kashmiri struggle against Indian occupation," Maulana
Arsalan Rahmani stated.
In early 1995, the Harakat
ul-Ansar was maintaining offices in most Pakistani cities, as well as
training facilities in Afghanistan and Pakistan. It expanded its global reach
in support for Islamist causes. "Ours is a truly international network of
genuine Muslim holly warriors," explained Khalid Awan, a Pakistani member.
"We believe frontiers could never divide Muslims. They are one nation and
they will remain a single entity." Harakat ul-Ansar are known to
be fighting in Kashmir, the Philippines, Bosnia, Tajikistan, and the Middle
East.
Meanwhile, the ISI continues to
provide the terrorists with new weapons. In the summer of 1993, the Kashmiri Mujahideen
were provided with long range and powerful missiles -- Saqr missiles
of Afghan War vintage. At that time, the Kashmiri and ISI crews were being
trained in the use of these missiles in Pakistani Kashmir.
Subsequently, there has been a
marked expansion of smuggling of quality weapons from Pakistan into Kashmir as
of late 1993. There has been a corresponding change in the terrorists' tactics,
introducing hit and run strikes by highly trained and well equipped
detachments. Among the new weapons now used in Kashmir are 107mm rockets, 60mm
mortars, automatic grenade launchers (Soviet and Chinese models), modification
of 57mm helicopter rocket pods with solar-powered sophisticated timing devise
for delayed firing barrages of rockets, and LAW-type tube-launched ATMs (Soviet
and Chinese models). A threshold was crossed in the spring of 1994, when the
ISI began providing the Kashmiri Islamists with Stinger SAMs. Indian security
forces captured a Stinger on 30 April 1994.
As of the fall of 1993, the
Kashmiri terrorists also began using sophisticated communication systems
including small radios (including systems with frequency hopping, selective
broadcast, digital burst communications, etc.) and collapsible solar-panels for
reload systems, as well as frequency scanning devise for detecting and homing
on military-type broadcasting. All the communication systems are of NATO/US
origin, with some components made in Japan.
All of these systems had been
used by the Mujahideen in Afghanistan, having been provided via the
ISI. There has been a large increase in the quantities of small arms provided
to the Kashmiris, including Type 56 ARs (PRC AK-47s), several types of machineguns,
long-range sniper rifles, pistols and RPGs, all of Soviet and Chinese makes.
Some of the Kashmiri terrorist began carrying highly specialized weapons such
as pen-guns for assassinations.
The ISI 'Afghan' and Kashmiri
forces also assist the flow of weapons and expertise to the Sikhs in the
Punjab. The main weapon depots for this new surge in subversion and terrorism
are in Baramulla and Kupwara area of the Kashmir Valley, where ISI-trained
Sikhs run the depot. In addition, there is a key depot for the Bhinranwale
Tiger Force of Khalistan in Singhpora. The source of these weapons are two
Hizb-ul-Mujahideen officials known to the Sikhs as Al-Umar and Fiaz
Ahmad.
In early 1994, the ISI already
had a force of 2,000-2,500 highly trained mujahideen assigned for
Kashmir, including Kashmiris, Arab 'Afghans' and Afghans. The key force
includes 1,000 Pakistani (inc. Pakistani-born Kashmiris), 500 Afghans, as well
as numerous Saudis, Egyptians, Sudanese, Algerians, Nigerians,
Jordanians/Palestinians and other foreign volunteers. Their main training bases
are in Peerpanjal range area. By the spring of 1994, when the weather permitted
the resumption of large-scale terrorist operations, the ISI controlled mujahideen,
most of them non-Kashmiri 'Afghans', were already firmly in control of the
escalation. Some of these ISI-mujahideen ultimately operated as the Al-Mujahideen
Force, ostensibly a "Kashmiri grass-roots" force with allegiance
to Sardar Abdul Qayum Khan.
In April-May alone, some 400 of
these 'Afghans' were infiltrated into Kashmir. Shaykh Jamal-Uddin, an Afghan mujahid
recently captured in Kashmir insists that the ISI-sponsored Islamist forces
already in Indian Kashmir are larger. "There are several thousand
Afghans/'Afghans' in the Valley," he stressed. The ISI-sponsored mujahideen
operate mainly under the banners of Hizb-ul-Mujahideen and Harakat
ul-Ansar. Several highly trained Afghans and Sudanese operatives were
infiltrated into the Valley to assume command over key networks of these
operations, as well as impose Islamism on the local population.
The summer of 1994 was a
fundamental turning point in the conduct of the Pakistan-sponsored Jihad in
Kashmir. The change did not take place on the battlefield. In order to ensure
its tight dominance over all aspects of the escalating Islamist Jihad
in Kashmir, Islamabad organized the 13 leading Islamist organizations into the
United Jihad Council [Muttahida Jihad Council - MJC]
under the leadership of Commander Manzur Shah, the leader of Jamiat-ul-Mujahideen,
and under the tight control of the ISI. Among the member organizations: Harakat
ul-Ansar, Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, Jamiat-ul-Mujahideen, Al-Jihad, Al-Barq,
Ikhwan-ul-Mussalmin, Tariq-ul-Mujahideen, and all other Islamist militant
organizations. The declared objective of the escalating Jihad is to
join Pakistan.
In early June 1994, Commander
Manzur Shah declared that the sole objective of the escalating Jihad
in Kashmir is to incorporate it into Pakistan. "The declarations of all
Kashmiri militant organizations have announced [that] Pakistan is their ideal
and goal. ... The freedom fighters will surrender [Kashmir] to the Pakistani
military and government." Commander Manzur Shah stressed that "the
Jihad has been getting stronger... The Mujahideen are getting
organized now and are attacking the Indian military strategically." He
admitted that Indian Kashmiri Muslim leaders were assassinated or attacked in
order to prevent them from reaching an agreement with the Indian government.
"Wali Mohammed would not have been assassinated and the caravans of Farooq
[Abdullah] and Rajesh Pilot would not have been attacked if the climate was
conducive to political action."
Meanwhile, a campaign of
assassinations was launched in order to eliminate the Kashmiri civic leadership
that opposed the escalation of the Jihad. On 20 June 1994, Islamist
terrorists assassinated the Kashmiri scholar Qazi Nissar Ahmad. He was
kidnapped a night before and pressured to endorse the anti-India Jihad.
He refused and was killed. A key member of the assassination squad was Fayaz
Ahmad Mir a.k.a. Abu-Bakr of Hizb-ul-Mujahideen. Ahmad was the 17th
Kashmiri Muslim scholar and civic leader to be assassinated by Islamists for
refusing to join the anti-India struggle.
Thus, by the fall of 1994, the
ISI was already successful in consolidating control over the Islamist armed
struggle in Kashmir. The ISI can now ensure that key operations and major
escalation in Kashmir will serve the strategic and political priorities and
interests of Islamabad.
*
This marked escalation in the
ISI's support for the Islamist insurgency and terrorism in Kashmir is a direct
by-product of Pakistan's national security policy and grand strategy. Ms.
Bhutto has repeatedly emphasized the centrality of the annexation of the entire
Kashmir for the long-term development of Pakistan. The new rail-line that will
connect Karachi and Central Asia must pass through Indian-held Kashmir to be
engineeringly and economically effective. Ms. Bhutto's Islamabad considers the
opening of the road to Central Asia by using Pakistan as the region's gateway
to the Indian Ocean as the key to the growth of Pakistan's commercial
activities. Kashmir is also Pakistan's true gateway to the PRC and into Central
Asia -- the path of the new Silk Road. And there lies the future and strategic
salvation of Pakistan.
Indeed, Islamabad expresses its
support for "the liberation of Kashmir" in more than words. ISI
support for Islamist terrorism and subversion in Kashmir continues to grow. In
recent months, there has been a noticeable improvement in the professional
skills of Islamist terrorists operating in Kashmir -- the result of the more
thorough training received in ISI-run camps in Pakistan. The is also an
increase in the deployment of high quality Afghans, Pakistani Kashmiris, and
Arab 'Afghans' into Indian Kashmir in order to bolster the local terrorist
organizations. Increasingly using sophisticated and heavy weapons recently
supplied by the ISI in Pakistan, these expert terrorists carry out quality
operations. The quality of the weapon systems available to the Kashmiri
insurgents crossing over from Pakistan also continue to improve. Islamabad is
fully aware of the extent of its active support for subversive operations
inside India, and considers it a tenet of its regional security policy.
Pakistan knows that the active
pursuit of the current Kashmir strategy may lead to an escalation of the face
off with India. Islamabad is ready to deal with this eventuality while
increasing its all out support for the Kashmiris. Indeed, Pakistani officials
are raising the ante of Islamabad's Indian strategy. In mid February 1995, a
Foreign Ministry spokesman warned that "if India carries out another
aggression and war breaks out between Pakistan and India, it would not be a war
of a thousand years or even a thousand hours but only a few minutes and India
should not be oblivious to the potential devastation." (The "thousand
year war" is a reference to Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's statement of the extent
of Pakistan's commitment to a struggle with India.) Other Pakistani officials
were quick to clarify the statement. They stressed that the statement
"warned India not by implication but in clear terms that the next war will
only last a few seconds and will bring inconceivable destruction and devastation.
This clearly indicates that the Pakistani Government has bravely displayed its
nuclear capability." The officials added that "Pakistan is really in
a position to strike a heavy blow against India through its nuclear capability."
What is most significant in both
the spokesman's statement and the subsequent clarifications is their context.
The strategic logic of using the nuclear factor to offset any deficiencies in
conventional military power has been the cornerstone of Pakistan's nuclear strategy.
Recently, a more assertive element was first introduced to the nuclear strategy
by Islamist politicians. The overall Pakistani strategic confidence has been
expressed in brinkmanship statements coming out of Islamabad since the fall of
1993. For example, Qazi Hussain Ahmad, the Jamaat i-Islami Chief
Senator, urged the Bhutto government "to declare Jihad on India
to save Kashmir Muslims from total annihilation." There is no other way to
resolve the crisis, he declared. "Let us wage Jihad for Kashmir.
A nuclear-armed Pakistan would deter India from a wider conflict," he
stressed. Thus, the statement of mid February 1995 confirms that the Bhutto
Government has indeed adopted the strategy and policy outlined by the
Islamists.
As the spring of 1995 draws near
and the weather improves, the ISI is about to unleash a new cycle of terrorism
and subversion. Considering the extent of the training, preparations, and
organizational effort invested in the Kashmiri Islamist insurgency during the
last few years, it is safe to assume that the fighting in the Kashmir will
escalate markedly in the coming year. Numerous additional highly trained and
well equipped Mujahideen, many of them professional special forces and
terrorists, will join the fighting in Kashmir and will even expand the struggle
into the rest of India. They already have in place extensive stockpiles of
weapons as well as large sums of money to sustain and support their Jihad.
Their primary mission, however, will not be the liberation of Kashmir but
rather furthering the strategic interests of Islamabad and Tehran.
1. Yossef Bodansky is the
Director of the Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare of the U.S.
Congress, as well as the World Terrorism Analyst with the Freeman Center for
Strategic Studies (Houston TX). He is a contributing editor of Defense and
Foreign Affairs; Strategic Policy, the author of three books (Target
America, Terror, and Crisis in Korea), several book chapters, and
numerous articles in several periodicals including Global Affairs, JANE's
Defence Weekly,Defense and Foreign Affairs; Strategic Policy, Business
Week. In the 1980s, he acted as a senior consultant for the Department of
Defense and the Department of State.
The opinions expressed in
these articles are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect
the views of the members of the Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional
Warfare, U.S. Congress, or any other branch of the U.S. Government.