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Pakistan’s Compulsions for
the Kargil Misadventure is a paper by Bidanda M. Chengappa, published in
‘Strategic Analysis’, a publication of the Institute for Defence Studies and
Analysis (IDSA), based in New Delhi, and associated with the Ministry of Defence.
It was published in the second half of 1999. Mr. Chengappa is a Senior Fellow
at IDSA.
Bidanda M. Chengappa, Senior Fellow, IDSA
Pakistan's military move
into the Kargil sector exploited the element of surprise in warfare and proved
to be a repetition of its earlier strategy against India. During the 1947-48
and 1965 Indo-Pakistani conflicts over Kashmir, Pakistan Army planners had
employed unconventional warfare in the initial phases of the war prior to the
"hot" war stage. In the first two conflicts, political relations had
deteriorated between the two sides prior to the outbreak of hostilities and, to
that extent, the onset of war may not have been such a surprise. However, this
time round the major difference was that despite the cordial state of political
relations between the two sides, Pakistan simultaneously initiated military
moves against India.
Clearly, the Kargil
intrusions highlight a shift in Pakistan's strategy from a low intensity
conflict operation (LICO), which was dependent on the infiltration of
mercenaries into Indian territory, to mounting an attack by infiltration
undertaken by professional military personnel masquerading as Mujahideen. In a
sense, this was similar to their strategy in Afghanistan wherein Pakistani
military personnel projected themselves as Taliban and achieved a military
victory. The Pakistani intrusions were possible because the intruded areas were
never held by either side owing to the adverse climatic conditions and the
excessive force levels required to do so.
Following Pakistan's
withdrawal from the Line of Control (LoC) and the hostilities winding down in
Kargil, Drass and Batalik, the rationale for the recent brinkmanship emerges
with more clarity. What were Islamabad's considerations for military posturing
with India ? Pakistan's policy formulation towards India is based on two
components : the traditional sense of insecurity and the dynamics of domestic
politics. Unlike traditional fears which are constant, the dynamics of domestic
politics are volatile.
Aim
This paper aims to examine
the rationale for Pakistan's military decision to cross the LoC on the basis of
the long and short-term aspects. While a long-term consideration revolves
around the basic insecurity of a smaller state, the short-term imperative
involves domestic politics and the need to divert the people's attention
towards external issues. This gives rise to a political dimension for the
military operation and, therefore, the assumption that there was a shared
agenda between the political and military leadership for the Kargil
misadventure. Morever, Pakistan's insecurity syndrome which is linked to the
size of the country and its armed forces also determines the nature of warfare
best suited against a bigger neighbour. To understand these issues, the article
analyses Pakistan's strategic stature, smaller nation syndrome, asymmetry of
power, domestic politics, the role of political Islam, and unconventional
warfare.
Strategic Stature
Pakistan's lack of strategic
stature, comprising territorial depth, economy, military and population
vis-à-vis India is the root cause of this insecurity. This deep-seated
insecurity manifests from time to time through tensions along the border
between the two sides and has almost become a semi-permanent feature of
Indo-Pakistan relations. Likewise, the exigencies of Pakistan's domestic
politics also condition Islamabad's relations with New Delhi. While Pakistan's
profile or national characteristics have generally remained the same for the
past five decades, its newly acquired nuclear weapon capability has altered the
existing politico-military equations with India. To that extent, nuclear
capability has induced a sense of strength and thereby security sufficient
enough for a smaller state to provoke a bigger neighbour by occupying border
territory. Pakistan's strategy during the pre-nuclear phase, for ten years from
July 1988 to May 1998, was confined to waging a proxy war or LICO, with the
government taking care to distance itself from the terrorist activities
conducted on Indian soil. However, after going overtly nuclear on May 28, 1998,
Pakistan's next major national security decision was to mount an attack by
infiltration against India.
Smaller Nation Syndrome
Pakistan's persistent
efforts to alter the balance of power in the subcontinent and achieve parity
with India were partially successful due to its participation in US-sponsored
alliances during the Cold War years. Smaller nations perceive threats to their
survival as independent entities from bigger neighbours in the international
system. In addition to the question of size, political instability, economic
dependence on big powers, besides linguistic and ethnic diversities complicate
their problems. It would, therefore, be relevant to enumerate the threats that
smaller nations envisage to their security from bigger neighbours. These
include: (a) outright incorporation of a state into another one; (b) turning a
small nation into a colony or satellite; (c) imposition of an unpopular regime;
(d) subversion; (e) undue influence over a small nation's external policy; (f)
undue influence over a small nation's internal policy.1
The Pakistani state since
independence has constantly raised the bogey of an Indian threat and its
political leaders continuously promote a fear psychosis of war among the
people. Their media also portrays a negative image of a militarised India with
hostile intentions against Pakistan. This exaggerated theme dominates the
entire outlook and thinking of the Pakistanis, owing to the Indian landmass of
1,269,640 square miles, with a population which is four times that of
Pakistan.2 As a result of such propaganda, a sense of vulnerability tends to
characterise the Pakistani mindset towards India. The line of thinking is that
their country is easily accessible through road, rail, sea or air and it would
be well nigh impossible to defend themselves with a physical barrier against
such a potential Indian threat. In such a situation, the shield of religion serves
as a useful protection and the cry of Islam-in-danger was raised and likely to
prove more effective by virtue of being a natural barrier. It was likely to be
more effective than a physical barrier.3
Asymmetry of power
A Pakistani commentator
holds the view that in the post-Cold War period, there is an imbalance of power
and resources in the subcontinent which was managed successfully during the
Cold War era.4 To quote, "The basic agenda for Pakistan must centre on
safeguarding the security and survival, keeping in view, the emergence to power
and influence of extremist forces in India." The view further states that
Islamabad in the 1990s finds the strategic environment unfavourable for its
national security interests which include:
(1) the Islamophobia of the
Western world which is associated with preventing nuclear proliferation and the
US-imposed country-specific embargoes on Pakistan.
(2) Conflictual interests
between the Western world and Islamic states over the control and exploitation
of oil resources in Muslim countries.
(3) The continuity of the
close India-Russia relationship, rather than a better balance in Moscow's ties
with the South Asian subcontinent.
(4) The problems in the
Pakistan-Iran relationship arising from their divergence of perception over
Afghanistan
(5) The rapprochement in
India-China relations wherein China would like to promote peace in the region
with a view to enable its own economic development.
(6) Poor state of the
Pakistani economy owing to short-sighted policies, mismanagement and absence of
financial discipline which has blunted national progress in technology and
industry, thereby enabling India to develop a technological edge.
A fallout of the asymmetry
of power is that these two subcontintental neighbours are in a perceived arms
race with each other, of the US- former USSR variety. In the 1990s, the two
countries have acquired arms to cope with their external threats. India
considers Pakistan a short-term military threat but envisages a strategic
threat from China. In the process, India equips its arsenal in tune with this
thinking but Islamabad views these military hardware acquisitions differently.5
A case in point is the
Indian purchase of eight Russian designed Sukhoi 30 heavy fighter aircraft
which were acquired in response to the Chinese purchase of Su 27 manufacturing
facilities from Russia in the mid-1990s. For Pakistan, however, the whole and
sole problem is India. And, therefore, its recent naval purchase of three
French designed Agosta submarines are in all likelihood to counter Indian
maritime power. This logic is applicable to the Indian and Pakistani nuclear
weapon tests and the Prithvi and Agni and Ghauri and Ghaznavi missile
programmes, respectively. Especially the Indian Pokhran and Pakistani Chagai
nuclear tests are a classic case of this security dilemma in Indo-Pakistan
ties. To that extent, these arms acquisitions which appear to be an arms race
are not the case owing to a lack of reciprocity. This is because the Indian
armament policy has to factor in the capability of Chinese weapons
systems/platforms.
For Pakistan, Indian arms
acquistions create insecurity and in turn their military planners attempt to
match the neighbour's weapon capabilities. As a result, such purchases of
military hardware on the subcontinent prima facie would give the impression of
an arms race. Eventually, these military hardware purchases, owing to
sensational media reportage on both sides of the subcontinent, coupled with
jingoistic statements by political leaders, add to the existing insecurity and
mistrust in the two countries.
Domestic Politics
This mistrust is exploited
by political leaders to project a threat from the other side only to divert the
attention of the people from domestic problems. Former Prime Minister Benazir
Bhutto, on July 10, 1999, in a Star Television interview, accused Prime
Minister Sharif of being party to the Kargil intrusions only to deflect public
focus onto an external issue and away from his misrule. This statement cannot
be dismissed lightly and needs to be understood in the context of the country's
politics.
Prime Minister Sharif
commenced his campaign against democracy with a constitutional crisis involving
the president, the judiciary and the elected government over the elevation of
some judges to the Supreme Court in 1997. Such a situation arose due to
differences between the chief justice and the prime minister. In the process,
the president resigned from office and thereafter brother judges deposed the
chief justice. The entire exercise enabled Sharif to strengthen his position in
the political power structure. After Sharif successfully neutralised the
judiciary, he sought to Islamise the Constitution with the exclusive objective
of emerging as the single power centre in the country. Finally, he started to
lash out at the Press by attacks and arrests against high profile editors who
were busy exposing his misdeeds and corruption over the past year. The Press
had been critical of Sharif over various issues which include: the Karachi problem,
the post nuclear test economic crisis, the Kalabagh Dam project, the army
chief's removal from office and the 15th Constitutional Amendment to impose
Islamic rule and governor's rule in Sindh. In the process, Sharif had a
conflictual relationship with the fourth estate since he assumed office in
February 1997 and he turned the tables on the Press corps by implementing the
"black" Press laws towards the end of 1998. He thereby succeeded in
muzzling the media in its attempt to play a watchdog in the democracy. However,
the media being a very visible pillar of democracy, proved to be problematic
for Sharif and perhaps resulted in a loss of political credibility.
The prime minister also
consolidated his relationship with the military by appointing an army chief of
his choice, General Pervez Musharaff, following General Jehangir Karamat's
resignation, thereby ensuring harmonious relations with the military
establishment. Benazir Bhutto in the same television interview stated that
Prime Minister Sharif was the political face of Islamic militancy but sought to
project himself as a moderate to the US leadership. The fact that Pakistani
commentators believe that Sharif was a "creation of the Army and ISI"
during the Zia regime only validates this utterance.
Role of Political Islam
During the late President
Zia-ul Haq's regime, the fundamentalist Tablighi Jamaat, an offshoot of the
Jamaat-e-Islami, developed close linkages with the Pakistan Army leadership.
Another factor which strengthened Islamisation of the Pakistan Army was its
collaborative relationship with the Afghan Mujahideen during the 1980s against
Soviet military occupation in South-West Asia. Former Chief of Army Staff
General Mirza Aslam Beg has recorded in his paper:6
The Afghanistan war of
liberation experience provides the strength for the Kashmiri freedom fighter in
the wider dimension of the conflict and should peace come to war ravaged
Afghanistan, the Mujahideen would like to pay back their gratitude they owe to
their Kashmiri brothers for joining them in their struggle against the Soviet
aggressor.
Prior to this, the Pakistan
Army has taken its pan-Islamic role very seriously and their personnel have
even fought in the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli Wars.7 Similarly, it may be
relevant to state that Pakistan joined the UN forces in Somalia and Bosnia only
because Muslim causes were involved there. This goes to show the degree of
import that Islam has in the Pakistan Army. For instance, Pakistani troops are
regularly given religious tests based on the Islamic tenets which are intended
to raise their level of indoctrination. The military promotes such religious
exercises because its strengthens their identity and ideology which is based on
religion.8
The nexus has been well
established between the Islamic fundamentalist groups like the
Hizb-ul-Mujahideen which was supported by the Jamaat-e-Islami . The support was
inclusive of money, weaponry and training assistance. Such assistance was in
addition to the help from the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). The ISI
established the Janbaz Mujahideen force to train Kashmiri militants in
subversion in Pakistan occupied Kashmir.
In 1985, the ISI had
instituted comprehensive terrorist training facilities for the Afghan
Mujahideen in Pakistan. Some of these Mujahideen were indoctrinated that Islam
was in danger in India, and then diverted to fight a guerilla war in Kashmir.
At the same time, Pakistan and other Islamic republics pumped money into
Kashmir to strenghten Islamic institutions like traditional schools for religious
learning, and in the process, emphasise the role of Islam among the people
there. Thereafter, with the rise of Islamic ideology in Kashmir, the bond
between the Kashmiri insurgents, their supporters and Islamabad grew stronger.
The close working relationship
between the Pakistan Army and the Mujahideen on the snowy Kargil heights only
bears out the Islamic militant links of the armed forces. The fact that the
army chief and the ISI chief are both prime ministerial appointees clearly
indicates that Sharif was well aware of the clandestine operations in Kargil.
To that extent, the policy to launch an intrusion was a shared agenda between
Sharif and the army leadership and, therefore, the prime minister cannot
distance himself from the Mujahideen or their activities.
Unconventional Warfare
A nation's military strategy
is shaped on the basis of its strategic stature and a small nation which
attempts to confront a bigger one, does so accordingly. In the Pakistani
context, various factors including economic capabilities, education levels,
technological strengths, strategic depth, foreign policy orientations, among
others, determine military strategy. Mismanaged economic policies lead to
inadequate spending on human developmental activities like primary education
which redu and and would be vulnerable to aerial attack. Lastly, the foreign
policy orientations, in terms of Pakistan's relations with the US and China,
coupled with increasing interaction between their militaries, tend to influence
professional outlooks and doctrines.
It would, therefore, be
necessary to briefly explain the linkages among the economy, technology,
territory and evolution of military strategy. Consider Pakistan's negligible
development of indigenously designed weapon systems and thereby the reliance on
hardware imported from foreign sources. During the late 1980s, the Pakistan
Ordnance Factories were unable to productionise its main battle tank Al Khalid
which snowballed into a controversy over an attempt to project the Chinese designed
tank as one of indigenous design. Similarly R&D in military aeronautics too
remains under-developed and hence neither licensed manufacture of aircraft,
through transfer of technology, nor their indigenous development would be
feasible. In such a hypothetical situation, therefore, an emphasis on armoured
warfare would not be a meaningful doctrine as tanks would need to be imported
which in turn would affect the level of foreign exchange reserves. Thus, owing
to inadequate indigenous design or production capabilities in the country,
military hardware assets like aircraft, tanks, or warships are all extremely
precious possessions. For instance, the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) chief had
stated in 1997 that the PAF was unable to maintain an effective operational
preparedness against India.9 As a result, such hardware would be optimally used
as defensive weapons rather than offensive ones. In the India-Pakistan context,
Pakistan as the smaller of the two states, has historically relied on an
unconventional warfare strategy against India which is a low-technology option
and not very expensive except for perhaps involving the use of helicopters as a
means of transportation.
The imbalance of power has
traditionally prompted the Pakistan Army to emphasise the role of unconventional
warfare or special operations involving the use of both irregular forces like
guerillas and regular forces like commandos. The Pakistan Army's close
relationship with the US military since 1952 resulted in the creation of a
special forces or commando unit designated "Special Services Group"
(SSG) in 1959.10 Also the Pakistan Army's connection with the Chinese Army was
instrumental in its adoption of a people's war doctrine as applicable to the
Kashmir context. Hence, the Pakistan Army has amalgamated the US and Chinese
military strategies of special operations and people's war respectively to
execute its recent "attack by infiltration" in Kargil against India.
In 1965, the Pakistan Army
used the SSG of commandos to sabotage Indian Air Force bases at Pathankot,
Adampur and Halwara. While the main body of commandos were parachuted into
Punjab, a good number were dropped into other Indian states. For instance, it
is reported that Pakistani commandos were also parachuted into various places
which include: one company of commandos between 90-120 men are supposed to have
landed 90 km from Delhi, a few were para-dropped near Gwalior, and small groups
were located in a few districts of West Bengal and Assam. The commandos were
generally tasked with targetting military and civilian installations like
airfields, petroleum storage facilities, communication centres, ammunition
depots, power houses, bridges and even industrial units.11
The then Chief of Army Staff
General Musa, in his book My Version: India-Pakistan War 1965 refers to the use
of SSG commandos and explains the reasons for their ineffectiveness during the
1965 operations.12 Firstly, their targets, especially the IAF bases at Halwara
and Adampur, were too deep in Indian territory for the commandos to exfiltrate
or exit safely to home territory. Secondly, the lack of proper army-air force
coordination resulted in the commandos being para-dropped only a couple of
hours before daybreak which did not give them adequate time to perform their
missions and find their way back. He states that of the 180 commandos who were
parachuted into enemy territory, only one officer and 10 men succeeded in
returning safely to base.
The author, however, states
that while the commandos may not have made a direct military impact, they were
able to divert an Indian Army brigade group from participating in a major
offensive in the Sialkot sector.13 The Indian troops were tasked to search and
locate the Pakistani commandos and were successful to that extent. The other spin-off
he claims from the commando action was to generate a fear psychosis among the
Indian people, he adds. An Indian writer estimates that almost 800-900
commandos were parachuted into Indian territory.14 Probably General Musa's
figure of 180 commandos only pertains to the group assigned to sabotage the IAF
air bases and not the overall figure.
Concluding Observations
In India-Pakistan relations,
the asymmetry of power is an inherent feature which fuels insecurity and
results in tensions along the border from time to time. In such a situation, a
smaller and, therefore, weaker state, is likely to attempt to correct the
imbalance of power through force of arms at an appropriate time. Accordingly,
Pakistan Army brass hats at the Rawalpindi-based General Headquarters (GHQ)
believed that this was the most opportune moment to strike the enemy as the
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led government was politically weakened and would,
therefore, be incapable of taking hard decisions. For instance, India had never
used airpower to strike the Pakistani intruders till now but the political
decision to do so for the first time in such a situation helped to achieve
military victory. The IAF was spectacularly successful in the aerial
bombardment of the Pakistani supply dumps in the Muntho Dhalo sector which had
the twin benefits of physically affecting their logistics, besides demoralising
the enemy forces.15
Pakistan's intrusions into
Kargil, could, therefore, be perceived as an act of desperation since the
insurgency in Kashmir may not have been progressing according to their plans.
At a macro-level, the Pakistani military initiative could be attributed to
three objectives : military, political and diplomatic. And Islamabad's
Kashmir-centric national security and foreign policy makes the Kashmir issue a
common theme for these three objectives.
For Pakistani military
planners, the compelling reason to initiate hostilities against India was aimed
at cutting off the logistics route— the National Highway 1 Alpha to the Siachen
Glacier—in order to eventually capture the area from India. The other
objectives were to alter the status of the LoC and provide a stimulus to the
weakening insurgency in Jammu & Kashmir. The Pakistanis possibly did not
expect Indian troops to recapture the occupied area as they were at an immense
advantage due to their position on the heights. Moreover, the intruders had
entrenched themselves so strongly into well-built bunkers that dislodging them
would prove costly in terms of heavy casualties. The Pakistani planners, given
these advantages, coupled with the element of surprise to begin with, had
envisaged their military presence on Indian territory to remain unhindered till
the onset of the approaching winter. Thereafter, under adverse climatic
conditions their military objective would stand a greater chance of success
against the Indian defending force. To that extent, the Pakistani planners had
formulated an innovative military operation which faltered due to an
unanticipated and hard-hitting Indian response.
For Islamabad apparently the
Kargil intrusions served as a means to distract the people from the gross
misgovernance at home and buy more time to survive in power. The national
economy was already in shambles with the debt repayment burden being a major
issue, and proved to be a serious problem for the government. This was further
compounded by its decision to freeze foreign currency accounts in the
post-nuclear test phase in May 1998 which only added to the unpopularity of the
government, besides several other acts of omission and commission. Probably in
the light of this background, for the political leadership, the intrusions into
Kargil served the purpose of internal cohesion through external aggression.
Pakistan, as a nuclear
weapon state locked in a conventional conflict with India, also a nuclear
weapon state, would only heighten the fears of a nuclear flashpoint on the
subcontinent and serve to internationalise the Kashmir issue. Such a situation
would expectedly draw US attention to the problem which Pakistan thought could
be made to work to its advantage provided the military situation was shaping
favourably. This could be interpreted as the diplomatic objective for the
Pakistani move into Kargil.
The Pakistani gameplan as it
unfolded, during May and June 1999 appears to have had a limited agenda without
earning any wider strategic gains. Evidently, the army leadership alone,
without consulting the Foreign Office, appears to have planned the attack by
infiltration for reasons of ensuring operational secrecy as is evident from
Islamabad's diplomatic debacle. Perhaps the GHQ at Rawalpindi planned the
military move in isolation without factoring in the potential for a negative
diplomatic fallout.
NOTES
1. P.S. Jayaramu, India's
National Security and Foreign Policy (New Delhi: ABC Publishers, 1987) p. 8;
also see Jasjit Singh, "Insecurity of Developing Nations, Especially Small
States", Strategic Analysis, September 1987, pp. 559-669.
2. Ratna Tikoo,
India-Pakistan Relations: Politics of Divergence and Convergence (New Delhi:
National Publishing House, 1987) p. 18.
3. Aslam Siddiqi, Pakistan
Seeks Security (Lahore, 1960) pp. 16-71, cited in Ibid., p. 18.
4. Dr Maqbool Ahmad Bhatty,
"Coping with Imbalance in South Asia", Dawn, October 25, 1998, cited
in POT (Pakistan), November 8, 1998, pp. 2659-60.
5. For a more detailed
discussion on this theme, see G.C. Raju Thomas, "The Growth of Indian
Military Power :From Sufficient Defence to Nuclear Deterrence" in Ross
Babbage and Sandy Gordon eds., India's Strategic Future (Delhi: Oxford
University Press, 1992) pp. 35-38; Pakistani Foreign Minister Assef Ahmad Ali
soon after the Indian Prithvi missile was tested said, " The Indians are
pushing us into a missile race. They are pushing us into an arms race and this
is indeed very unfortunate", Strategic Digest, August 1996, p. 1359.
6. General (retd) Mirza
Aslam Beg, "Defence Planning in the Era of Strategic Uncertainty",
paper for the seminar on Asian Security in the 21st Century, held by the IDSA,
New Delhi, January 27-28, 1999, p. 25.
7. Army Liaison Cell (Army
Headquarters) publication, "Islamisation of Pakistan's Military", p.
2.
8. Ibid., p. 2; also see
"Army and Islam: An Appraisal", Strategic Digest, October 1996, pp.
1507-1512.
9. In the mid-1990s, two PAF
chiefs have gone on record about the PAF's increasing inferiority compared to
the IAF. Initially, Air Chief Marshal Abbas Khattak said that the PAF is losing
its combat edge over India. To quote, "That qualitative edge which we had
before 1992 is eroding", Strategic Digest, September 1997 (Defence and
Disarmament Review), p. 1502. Subsequently, Air Chief Marshal Pervaiz Mehdi
Quereshi expressed worry over Indian air power capabilities. He said, " If
this widening technological disparity between India and Pakistan is not plugged
or narrowed down within the next 36 to 48 months, it would pose a direct threat
to national security." He added, "India had as many as 232 hi-tech
aircraft as opposed to the 32 F-16 fighter aircraft of the PAF", Strategic
Digest, March 1998 (Defence and Disarmament Review), pp. 513-514.
10. Jasjit Singh, "The
Army in the Power Structure of Pakistan", Strategic Analysis, October
1995, pp. 875-876.
11. H.R. Gupta,
India-Pakistan War 1965 (Delhi: Hariyana Prakasan, 1967) pp. 296-305.
12. General (retd) H.J.
Musa, My Version: India-Pakistan War 1965 (Lahore: Wajidalis, 1983) pp. 78-79.
13. Ibid.
14. n. 11, p. 304.
15. R. Prasannan, "An
Attack: It is Unlike Any Other Air War", (cover story), The Week, June 13,
1999, pp. 36-37.